Assumption of knowledge and the Chinese Room in Turing test interrogation
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To link to this item DOI: 10.3233/AIC-140601
Whilst common sense knowledge has been well researched in terms of intelligence and (in particular) artificial intelligence, specific, factual knowledge also plays a critical part in practice. When it comes to testing for intelligence, testing for factual knowledge is, in every-day life, frequently used as a front line tool. This paper presents new results which were the outcome of a series of practical Turing tests held on 23rd June 2012 at Bletchley Park, England. The focus of this paper is on the employment of specific knowledge testing by interrogators. Of interest are prejudiced assumptions made by interrogators as to what they believe should be widely known and subsequently the conclusions drawn if an entity does or does not appear to know a particular fact known to the interrogator. The paper is not at all about the performance of machines or hidden humans but rather the strategies based on assumptions of Turing test interrogators. Full, unedited transcripts from the tests are shown for the reader as working examples. As a result, it might be possible to draw critical conclusions with regard to the nature of human concepts of intelligence, in terms of the role played by specific, factual knowledge in our understanding of intelligence, whether this is exhibited by a human or a machine. This is specifically intended as a position paper, firstly by claiming that practicalising Turing's test is a useful exercise throwing light on how we humans think, and secondly, by taking a potentially controversial stance, because some interrogators adopt a solipsist questioning style of hidden entities with a view that it is a thinking intelligent human if it thinks like them and knows what they know. The paper is aimed at opening discussion with regard to the different aspects considered.