Accessibility navigation


Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: an example from Tanzania

Robinson, E. J.Z., Albers, H. J., Ngeleza, G. and Lokina, R. B. (2014) Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: an example from Tanzania. Ecological Economics, 107. pp. 242-248. ISSN 0921-8009

Full text not archived in this repository.

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.08.004

Abstract/Summary

In low-income countries, both nearby local villagers, “insiders”, and non-locals, “outsiders”, extract products from protected forests even though their actions are illegal. Forest managers typically combine enforcement and livelihood projects offered to nearby communities to reduce this illegal activity, but with limited budgets cannot deter all extraction. We develop a game theoretic model of a forest manager's decision interacting with the extraction decisions of insiders and outsiders. Our analysis suggests that, depending on the relative ecological damage caused by each group, budget-constrained forest managers may reduce total forest degradation by legalizing “insider” extraction in return for local villagers' involvement in enforcement activities against outsiders.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Economic and Social Sciences Division > Food Economics and Marketing (FEM)
ID Code:37670
Uncontrolled Keywords:Participatory forest management; Enforcement; Tanzania; Charcoal production; Non-timber forest products; Bee keeping; Livelihood projects; Energy
Publisher:Elsevier

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Page navigation