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Borderline cases and the collapsing principle

Elson, L. (2014) Borderline cases and the collapsing principle. Utilitas, 26 (1). pp. 51-60. ISSN 1741-6183

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1017/S095382081300023X

Abstract/Summary

John Broome has argued that value incommensurability is vagueness, by appeal to a controversial ‘collapsing principle’ about comparative indeterminacy. I offer a new counterexample to the collapsing principle. That principle allows us to derive an outright contradiction from the claim that some object is a borderline case of some predicate. But if there are no borderline cases, then the principle is empty. The collapsing principle is either false or empty.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:39644
Uncontrolled Keywords:incommensurability
Publisher:Cambridge University Press

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