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A revenge problem without the concept of truth

Pinder, M. (2015) A revenge problem without the concept of truth. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 4 (3). pp. 151-161. ISSN 2161-2234

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1002/tht3.168

Abstract/Summary

The vast majority of putative solutions to the liar paradox face the infamous revenge problem. In recent work, however, Kevin Scharp has extensively developed an exciting and highly novel ‘inconsistency approach’ to the paradox that, he claims, does not face revenge. If Scharp is right, then this represents a significant step forward in our attempts to solve the liar paradox. However, in this paper, I raise a revenge problem that faces Scharp’s inconsistency approach.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:40849
Publisher:Wiley

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