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Community projects: an experimental analysis of a fair implementation process

Cicognani, S., D'Ambrosio, A., Güth, W., Pfuderer, S. and Ploner, M. (2015) Community projects: an experimental analysis of a fair implementation process. Social Choice and Welfare, 44 (1). pp. 109-132. ISSN 1432-217X

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0822-y

Abstract/Summary

We define and experimentally test a public provision mechanism that meets three basic ethical requirements and allows community members to influence, via monetary bids, which of several projects is implemented. For each project, participants are assigned personal values, which can be positive or negative. We provide either public or private information about personal values. This produces two distinct public provision games, which are experimentally implemented and analyzed for various projects. In spite of the complex experimental task, participants do not rely on bidding their own personal values as an obvious simple heuristic whose general acceptance would result in fair and efficient outcomes. Rather, they rely on strategic underbidding. Although underbidding is affected by projects’ characteristics, the provision mechanism mostly leads to the implementation of the most efficient project.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Economic and Social Sciences Division > Food Economics and Marketing (FEM)
ID Code:41036
Uncontrolled Keywords:C91; C72; D63
Publisher:Springer

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