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Smug alert! Exploring self-licensing behaviour in a cheating game

Clot, S., Grolleau, G. and Ibanez, L. (2014) Smug alert! Exploring self-licensing behaviour in a cheating game. Economics Letters, 123 (2). pp. 191-194. ISSN 0165-1765

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.039

Abstract/Summary

We test experimentally a prediction of the ‘moral credit model’, in which committing a virtuous act creates moral credits that can license immoral behavior in a succeeding decision. We use a basic cheating experiment that was either preceded by a virtuous deed or not in a developing country context. We found that people who previously achieved a good deed cheat more. Gender and origin are also significant explicative variables for cheating.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
ID Code:47426
Publisher:Elsevier

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