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Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals

Attanasi, G., Garcia Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N. and Montesano, A. (2012) Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals. Environmental Economics, 3 (4). pp. 35-42. ISSN 1998-605X

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Abstract/Summary

This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental agreements as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game with multiple asymmetric equilibria. Second, the article applies the theory on non-cooperative games with confirmed proposals, based on an alternating proposals bargaining protocol, as a way of overcoming the usual problems of coordination and bargaining failures in environmental agreement games, due to payoff asymmetry and equilibrium multiplicity.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Economic and Social Sciences Division > Food Economics and Marketing (FEM)
ID Code:52186
Publisher:Business Perspectives

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