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Priority monism and essentiality of fundamentality: a reply to Steinberg

Benocci, M. (2017) Priority monism and essentiality of fundamentality: a reply to Steinberg. Philosophical Studies, 178 (8). pp. 1983-1990. ISSN 1573-0883

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1007/s11098-016-0778-0

Abstract/Summary

Steinberg has recently proposed an argument against Schaffer’s priority monism. The argument assumes the principle of Necessity of Monism, which states that if priority monism is true, then it is necessarily true. In this paper, I argue that Steinberg’s objection can be eluded by giving up Necessity of Monism for an alternative principle, that I call Essentiality of Fundamentality, and that such a principle is to be preferred to Necessity of Monism on other grounds as well.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:68348
Publisher:Springer

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