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Who to lobby and when: institutional determinants of interest group strategies in European Parliament committees

Marshall, D. (2010) Who to lobby and when: institutional determinants of interest group strategies in European Parliament committees. European Union Politics, 11 (4). pp. 553-575. ISSN 1741-2757

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1177/1465116510382462

Abstract/Summary

This paper explains how institutional conditions in the European Parliament’s committees shape lobbyists’ strategic behaviour. Committees’ informal organization and formal procedures structure both the distribution of legislative influence and the opportunity to obtain advocacy. It is demonstrated how influence and, by implication, lobbying activity are skewed in favour of a committee elite. Here new evidence is provided to highlight the significant impact that open amendments play in a committee’s final report. The theory also emphasizes the role that message quality plays in the decision about who to lobby, and defines the limits to lobbyists’ preference to obtain advocacy from friendly legislators. Analysis is carried out on data obtained from 94 structured interviews combined with a unique data set of committee-stage voting outcomes.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Politics and International Relations
ID Code:70033
Publisher:Sage

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