Accessibility navigation


Risky business? Welfare state reforms and government support in Britain and Denmark

Lee, S., Jensen, C., Arndt, C. and Wenzelburger, G. (2020) Risky business? Welfare state reforms and government support in Britain and Denmark. British Journal of Political Science, 50 (1). pp. 165-184. ISSN 1469-2112

[img]
Preview
Text - Accepted Version
· Please see our End User Agreement before downloading.

829kB
[img]
Preview
Text (Appendix) - Supplemental Material
· Please see our End User Agreement before downloading.

415kB

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

To link to this item DOI: 10.1017/S0007123417000382

Abstract/Summary

Are welfare state reforms electorally dangerous for governments? Political scientists have only recently begun to study this seemingly simple question, and existing work still suffers from two shortcomings. First, it has never tested the reform–vote link with data on actual legislative decisions for enough points in time to allow robust statistical tests. Secondly, it has failed to take into account the many expansionary reforms that have occurred in recent decades. Expansions often happen in the same years as cutbacks. By focusing only on cutbacks, estimates of the effects of reforms on government popularity become biased. This article addresses both shortcomings. The results show that voters punish governments for cutbacks, but also reward them for expansions, making so-called compensation, a viable blame-avoidance strategy. The study also finds that the size of punishments and rewards is roughly the same, suggesting that voters’ well-documented negativity bias does not directly translate into electoral behavior.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Politics and International Relations
ID Code:73329
Publisher:Cambridge University Press

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Page navigation