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What makes a judgement a moral judgement

Hooker, B. (2017) What makes a judgement a moral judgement. Journal of Political Theory and Philosophy, 1 (1). pp. 97-112.

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Official URL: http://jptp.online/what-makes-a-judgement-a-moral-...

Abstract/Summary

What distinguishes moral judgements from judgements of other kinds? In addressing this question, this paper tries to remain as neutral as possible about which moral judgments are correct. The paper addresses objections to thinking that the defining feature of moral judgements is their other-regarding grounds, or their social function, or their motivational force, or their connection to reactive attitudes such as guilt, indignation, and resentment. The proposal this paper makes is that a judgment is a moral judgment if and only if this judgment is a member of a group of judgments of which some do carry commitment to the appropriateness of such reactive attitudes.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:74596
Publisher:JPTP

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