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On some standard objections to mathematical conventionalism

Schroeder, S. (2018) On some standard objections to mathematical conventionalism. Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 30. pp. 83-98. ISSN 0353-3891

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To link to this item DOI: 10.5937/BPA1730083S

Abstract/Summary

According to Wittgenstein, mathematical propositions are rules of grammar, that is, conventions, or implications of conventions. So his position can be regarded as a form of conventionalism. However, mathematical conventionalism is widely thought to be untenable due to objections presented by Quine, Dummett and Crispin Wright. It has also been argued that only an implausibly radical form of conventionalism could withstand the critical implications of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. In this article I discuss those objections to conventionalism and argue that none of them is convincing.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:75539
Publisher:Institute for Philosophy, University of Belgrade

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