Accessibility navigation


The dizzying turn of epistemic contextualism

Grindrod, J. (2020) The dizzying turn of epistemic contextualism. Metaphilosophy, 51 (1). pp. 87-96. ISSN 1467-9973

[img] Text - Accepted Version
· Restricted to Repository staff only until 24 January 2022.

161kB

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

To link to this item DOI: 10.1111/meta.12406

Abstract/Summary

The debate concerning epistemic contextualism represents a kind of linguistic turn in epistemology, where the focus has shifted from theorising about knowledge to theorising about knowledge attributions. Such a shift may well prove valuable, but only if we are clear on what the relationship is between a semantic analysis of knowledge attributions and a philosophical analysis of knowledge. One plausible approach is to claim that the semantic analysis entails and is entailed by the philosophical analysis. Yet this view - referred to here as the default view - has been explicitly adopted by few in the contextualism debate. This paper considers a form of argument in favour of the default view, and then considers the challenges that arise from either accepting or rejecting the default view.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:88334
Publisher:Blackwell Publishing

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Page navigation