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Do the welfare benefits weaken the economic vote? A cross-national analysis of the welfare state and economic voting

Park, B. B. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7656-3609 and Shin, J. (2019) Do the welfare benefits weaken the economic vote? A cross-national analysis of the welfare state and economic voting. International Political Science Review, 40 (1). pp. 108-125. ISSN 0192-5121

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1177/0192512117716169

Abstract/Summary

Comparative economic voting studies have found great instability in economic voting across countries and over time. In explaining this instability, we highlight the role of welfare systems because strong welfare protection attenuates voters’ incentives to base their vote on government economic performance. By analyzing 174 legislature elections in 31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 1980 to 2010 and by taking into account clarity of responsibility, we find that welfare protection weakens the linkage between macroeconomic outcomes and incumbent electoral fortunes. This result implies that strong welfare protection enables politicians to avoid blame for economic failures.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Politics and International Relations
ID Code:92857
Publisher:SAGE Publications

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