Mavrodimitrakis, C.
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7436-9164
(2022)
Debt stabilization and financial stability in a monetary union: market versus authority‐based preventive solutions.
International Journal of Finance & Economics.
ISSN 1099-1158
doi: 10.1002/ijfe.2288
Abstract/Summary
Is a debt-concerned monetary authority desirable? This article deals with the impact of fiscal-monetary policy interactions in a monetary union on country-specific and union-wide debt stabilization, when the authorities act strategically. The focus is on the impact that monetary policy would have on a debt-concerned fiscal authority through the debt constraint and the corresponding interaction with decentralized fiscal policies. It is shown that the fiscal-monetary (overall) policy coordination strategic regime delivers better results than the non-cooperative regime for both the output gap and the outstanding level of debt at the union level. Two further institutional arrangements are investigated and compared: An authority-based preventive procedure, which works through a debt-concerned monetary authority, and a market-based one, which works through financial markets by assuming a risk premium on country-specific nominal interest rates according to the country-specific fiscal stances. The risk premium acts as a form of ‘market-based’ discipline. Both regimes stand between the decentralized and the centralized setting. The central bank's optimal weight on union-wide debt stabilization is computed when financial markets provide discipline to the fiscal authorities. It is optimal for the social planner to appoint a debt-concerned central banker, if there is a degree of conservatism from the monetary authority, and/or if the social planner cares about union-wide debt stabilization. A higher risk premium parameter enhances the impact of the former on the optimal weight on union-wide debt stabilization, while it reduces the impact of the latter.
Altmetric Badge
| Item Type | Article |
| URI | https://centaur.reading.ac.uk/id/eprint/100306 |
| Identification Number/DOI | 10.1002/ijfe.2288 |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Divisions | No Reading authors. Back catalogue items Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics |
| Publisher | Wiley |
| Download/View statistics | View download statistics for this item |
University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record
Download
Download