Abstract/Summary

To many a key question now is how can you control how to portray yourself online ? Increasingly availability of information linked to an individual can create an everlasting digital memory which may not be acceptable to you. Awareness of loss of privacy due to the increasing flow of personal data has newly focused concern on the accessibility and retention of personal data. In line with the fundamental right of data protection, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), following a seminal ruling of the Court of Justice in Google Spain v Gonzalez, recognized a new right for individuals to have personal data erased. Here the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted the Data Protection Directive ( DPD ) in light of the European Charter of Human Rights, finding that a right to be forgotten existed, thus enabling Senor Gonzalez to de-link information. This right was ultimately formalized within the EU through implementation of Article 17 of the GDPR. Much literature exists examining the status of the right to be forgotten, however this thesis argues that the scope of the right is wider than debated, revealing its true importance in informational self-determination. The court’s decision created what was declared to be a new right not only with origins in applying data protection through Articles 12 and 14 of the DPD to support privacy but also evoking rights of dignity and reputation. This provides for an individual to control access and availability to personal data, ultimately creating an option to determine how they are portrayed on the Internet. The potential for Informational selfdetermination to be exercised through this right could provide an unprecedented ability for an individual to use it portray themselves as they may so determine. By examining the historical underpinnings of human rights ultimately leading to the fundamental right of data protection, the importance of the Google Spain case, prior to article 17 and subsequent significant EU case law, this thesis aims to contribute to an analysis of the wider scope and use of the right to be forgotten. It draws on normative reviews and positivist conclusions towards arguments that this new right can be considered to provide this new form of informational self-determination and specifically to enable an individual to determine how they are portrayed online. This use then supports not only privacy but dignity and reputation, enabling rehabilitation into a society where past events no longer have relevance in the portrayal of an individual through the Internet.