Hobbes, Constant, and Berlin on LibertyCromartie, A. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-9558-8081 (2022) Hobbes, Constant, and Berlin on Liberty. History of European Ideas, 48 (3). pp. 214-228. ISSN 0191-6599
It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.1080/01916599.2022.2056330 Abstract/SummaryIsaiah Berlin’s ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ regards both Hobbes and Constant as supporting the negative version. Both took a favourable view of the freedom to live as one pleases. But this shared preference arose from radically different overall philosophies. Hobbes’s support for freedom as ‘the silence of the laws’ reflected his view of happiness as preference-satisfaction. Constant’s support for freedom as a sphere of absolute rights was supplemented by support for active citizenship and connected with belief in ‘perfectibility’ that was itself linked to religion. These theories involve altogether different understandings of the image of an ‘area’ preserved from interference. Berlin takes over from Constant an appeal to human nature without the idea of progress that had supported it.
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