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Epistemic standards and value: a puzzle

Grindrod, J. (2022) Epistemic standards and value: a puzzle. Logos & Episteme, 13 (3). pp. 265-272. ISSN 2069-3052

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To link to this item DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202213322

Abstract/Summary

In this paper, I present a puzzle that arises if we accept i) that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief and ii) that whether a person counts as knowing is dependent upon a context-sensitive epistemic standard. Roughly, the puzzle is that if both claims are true, then we should always seek to keep the epistemic standard as low as possible, contrary to what seems like appropriate epistemic behaviour. I consider and reject a number of different ways of avoiding this consequence before presenting my own solution to the puzzle: that any view that posits a context-sensitive epistemic standard must relativize epistemic value as well.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:108509
Publisher:Institute for Economic and Social Research of The Romanian Academy

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