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The immaterial soul and the embodied human being: Descartes on mind and body

Cottingham, J. (2023) The immaterial soul and the embodied human being: Descartes on mind and body. Think, 22 (63). pp. 7-13. ISSN 1755-1196

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1017/S1477175622000276

Abstract/Summary

Descartes’s arguments in support of his claim that the mind is an immaterial substance are examined and found wanting. But despite the flaws in his dualistic view of the mind, Descartes has fascinating and important things to say about how much of human experience involves an ‘intermingling’ of mind and body. There are still philosophical lessons to be learnt from Descartes’s legacy.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:111314
Publisher:Th Royal Institute of Philosophy

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