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A defence of conceptual analysis as a linguistic endeavour

Grindrod, J. ORCID: (2023) A defence of conceptual analysis as a linguistic endeavour. Theoria, 89 (4). pp. 516-534. ISSN 1755-2567

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1111/theo.12477


In this paper, I outline and defend a traditional yet controversial view of conceptual analysis, particularly as it is used in epistemology. I will defend the view against a number of objections, all of which focus on the idea that conceptual analysis relies upon linguistic intuitions. Rather than trying to deny this claim, I will seek to vindicate the use of conceptual analysis within epistemology even given its reliance on linguistic intuitions. To do so, I first outline the view of conceptual analysis I have in mind and then respond to three broad objections from Quill Kukla (2015), Allan Hazlett (2018) and Stephen Stich (1988; 2009).

Item Type:Article
Divisions:Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:111927


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