Wittgenstein’s early philosophical feeling and “the relative position of logic and mechanics”

Preston, J. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3740-2308 (2025) Wittgenstein’s early philosophical feeling and “the relative position of logic and mechanics”. In: Heinrich-Ramharter, E., Pichler, A. and Stadler, F. (eds.) 100 Years of ›Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus‹ – 70 Years after Wittgenstein’s Death. De Gruyter. doi: 10.1515/9783111453040-032 (Proceedings of the 44th International Wittgenstein Symposium.)

Abstract/Summary

The Tractatus’ remarks on natural science contain the idea of comparing different forms of mechanics in terms of the unity and simplicity with which they can be used to describe the world. The Notebooks, surprisingly, pointed to this specific idea as something Wittgenstein had already felt ‘for a long time’. The mesh metaphor that follows is supposed to allow us to see ‘the relative position of logic and mechanics’. I argue first that Wittgenstein takes mechanics not to consist in Bilder, pictures. Evidence against this reading is addressed, before I move on to the idea that each form of mechanics is an ‘a priori insight into the forms in which the propositions of science can be cast’. I argue that one must go further than such a declaration, since the Tractatus contains ideas that make it problematic. Making the required link to logic, I introduce the idea of understanding the concepts of mechanics as ‘formal concepts’. I use this Tractarian notion to make sense of Wittgenstein’s attitude towards metaphysics. Finally, I explain what the relative position of logic and mechanics is, by reference to the idea of forms of representation.