Abstract/Summary

Public speakers often use their speech to mobilize their audience—that is, to motivate their audience to take action, collectively, in support of a political cause. But successfully mobilizing a group can be extremely difficult. To overcome this difficulty, mobilizers frequently resort to deploying falsehoods, for example by exaggerating the odds of success associated with political action, downplaying the costs of political action, or idealizing historical figures to inspire just acts of emulation. Yet such “mobilizing falsehoods” are deeply controversial, even when deployed in support of a just cause. Specifically, one might worry that mobilizing falsehoods are deceptive, which in turn makes them undemocratic and injurious to personal autonomy. The present article aims to defend mobilizing falsehoods against this challenge, by developing two lines of argument. First, I demonstrate that some falsehoods (“transparent” falsehoods) can mobilize without purporting to be true—and so, without deceiving. Second, I contend that mobilizing falsehoods can be permissible even when they are not transparent. This is not simply because some non-transparent falsehoods are less deceptive than others, but also because, even insofar as mobilizing falsehoods are deceptive, they can be reconciled with—and indeed, positively enhance—a robust system of democratic contestation.