Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibriumBach, C. W. and Tsakas, E. (2014) Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior, 85. pp. 48-59. ISSN 1090-2473 Full text not archived in this repository. It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.017 Abstract/SummaryWe introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundation for Nash equilibrium in terms of pairwise epistemic conditions locally imposed on only some pairs of players. Our main result considerably weakens not only the standard sufficient conditions by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), but also the subsequent generalization by Barelli (2009). Surprisingly, our conditions do not require nor imply mutual belief in rationality.
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