Incomplete information and iterated strict dominanceBach, C. W. and Perea, A. (2021) Incomplete information and iterated strict dominance. Oxford Economic Papers, 73 (2). pp. 820-836. ISSN 1464-3812 Full text not archived in this repository. It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpz075 Abstract/SummaryThe solution concept of iterated strict dominance for static games with complete information recursively deletes choices that are inferior. Here, we devise such an algorithm for the more general case of incomplete information. The ensuing solution concept of generalized iterated strict dominance is characterized in terms of common belief in rationality as well as in terms of best response sets. Besides, we provide doxastic conditions that are necessary and sufficient for modelling complete information from a one-person perspective.
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