Informal procedures, institutional change, and EU decision-making: evaluating the effects of the 1974 Paris summitGolub, J. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2686-139X and Ovádek, M. (2024) Informal procedures, institutional change, and EU decision-making: evaluating the effects of the 1974 Paris summit. Journal of European Public Policy. ISSN 1466-4429
It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2024.2434071 Abstract/SummaryThe Paris summit of 1974 produced an informal agreement to renounce a previous informal agreement, the famous Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 about qualified majority voting (QMV). The dominant view within existing scholarship is that the Paris summit had no effect because the Luxembourg Compromise and its consensus norm persisted at least into the 1980s: QMV was inoperative before and remained inoperative after. Using quantitative analysis and extensive process tracing, we provide the first systematic empirical test of this conventional view and of the summit’s effects. Although superficially our null finding (no effect) appears to confirm previous accounts, it constitutes further evidence against prevailing “veto culture” narratives and challenges existing theories about informal institutions and institutional change.
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