Abstract/Summary

Subversive activities by state-sponsored proxies – military and non-military non-state actors (NSAs) – are a staple in the strategic toolbox of grey zone operators. They are neither new, nor rare. What is more, sponsor-proxy relations are on the rise. This report addresses the following question: Given the likelihood of state-sponsored NSA attacks in the future, how should states approach strategies for countering proxies and their state sponsors? First, the paper presents an overview of non-state actors as proxies. Second, it discusses the prevalence and variation of NSA-state relationships as a corrective to academic and policy approaches that take a narrow and simplistic view of NSA sponsorship. Third, it shows how a more robust understanding of the phenomenon allows for a more nuanced engagement with the deterrence playbook. To this end, the paper focuses on the situation, self, solutions, and synchronization that the published playbook defines and presents under the moniker of the ‘4S model’.