Abstract/Summary

Some philosophers have sought to reject industrial animal agriculture by appealing to what we may call the Principle of Unnecessary Harm – the principle according to which it is wrong to cause, or support practices that cause, extensive, unnecessary harm to animals. Since factory farming causes extensive, unnecessary harm, so the argument goes, it is morally impermissible. But, as some philosophers have argued, certain forms of industrial plant agriculture may also cause extensive harm to animals as a result of harvesting, pesticides, and land clearing. Furthermore, this harm may be unnecessary, since we could eat plants from less harmful sources such as backyard or vertical farms. If so, then simply being vegan (or having a diet consisting of plants and non-factory-farmed animal products) is not good enough, since one may also have an obligation to abstain from certain plant foods if the production of such foods also causes unnecessary harm to animals. In this paper, I assess the plausibility of this argument. First, I consider several arguments as to why industrial plant agriculture may not cause extensive harm to animals. I show that these arguments face significant difficulties, and argue that more empirical support is needed to dispute the claim that industrial plant agriculture causes extensive harm to animals. I then argue, however, that even if it does cause extensive harm to animals, this harm is plausibly necessary. For this reason, I argue, the practice as-a-whole is not morally problematic according to the Principle of Unnecessary Harm. I finish by addressing the concern that even if the practice as-a-whole does not cause extensive, unnecessary harm to animals, certain individuals may have an obligation to abstain from purchasing industrially produced plant foods.