Abstract/Summary

The coordinated offensive of 21 November 1971 marked India’s first overt military intervention inside the East Pakistan, in support of the ongoing Liberation War of Bangladesh. Following the November offensive, Bangladeshi forces intensified their fight against Pakistani forces; however, India took a ‘strange’ pause till 03 December. This article explores the geopolitical significance of the November Offensive. It explains why India took the odd pause, how Pakistan reacted to it, and how significant was the November offensive from Bangladesh’s perspective. Exploring the archival records of the United Nations, Indian Lok Sabaha and Bangladesh Liberation War, the article argues that India opted for the odd pause to secure international legitimacy and relegated her November offensive in the East as an insignificant prelude. Pakistan’s reaction-a pre-emptive air strike on Indian airfields in the Western Sector-transformed the Liberation War into an IndoPak war and exposed her as an initiator and aggressor. Unlike India, the November offensive was not a ‘prelude’ for Bangladesh but a continuation of the war and a merger of the two Forces; it exposed the wartime government to the geopolitics of an internationalised civil war. Consequently, the first Operational Directive issued by the Commander-in-Chief of Bangladesh Forces on 22 November, placed the two Forces under a unified command and, more importantly, lending a layer of legitimacy for both Forces while retaining the political authority and ownership of the War. Bangladesh and India were guided by geopolitical considerations-exemplifying Clausewitz’s maxim that war is an instrument of (geo)politics by other means.