Accessibility navigation


Delegated proof-of-stake-based incentive mechanism for secure and efficient blockchain storage in the internet of things

Chen, W., Wang, J., Pan, J.-S., Sherratt, R. S. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7899-4445 and Wang, J. (2025) Delegated proof-of-stake-based incentive mechanism for secure and efficient blockchain storage in the internet of things. IEEE Internet of Things Journal. ISSN 2372-2541 (In Press)

[thumbnail of Author version] Text (Author version) - Accepted Version
· Restricted to Repository staff only
· The Copyright of this document has not been checked yet. This may affect its availability.

3MB

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

To link to this item DOI: 10.1109/JIOT.2025.3617248

Abstract/Summary

The explosive growth of Internet of Things (IoT) data demands secure and reliable storage, where traditional centralized solutions often fall short. Blockchain offers decentralization and tamper-resistance, making it a promising foundation for IoT. However, IoT blockchain systems based on Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) face challenges such as weak node incentives, unfair reward distribution, and low consensus efficiency. This paper proposes a fairness-aware incentive mechanism that accounts for both node capability and effort under information asymmetry. By incorporating fairness preferences into the contract design, the mechanism improves participation and motivates sustained effort. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that our approach enhances throughput by about 15%, while achieving revenue fairness, incentive compatibility, and stronger consensus performance. The mechanism’s adaptability makes it suitable for diverse IoT application scenarios.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Life Sciences > School of Biological Sciences > Biomedical Sciences
Life Sciences > School of Biological Sciences > Department of Bio-Engineering
ID Code:124900
Publisher:Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Page navigation