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Artificial Intelligence and the prohibition on the use of force: intention and causation

Buchan, R. (2026) Artificial Intelligence and the prohibition on the use of force: intention and causation. International Law Studies, 107. ISSN 2375-2831

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Official URL: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol107/iss1/...

Abstract/Summary

This article examines the application of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter 1945 to AI-enabled systems that carry out unintended engagements involving the use of force. First, it argues that the prohibition on the use of force is based on objective rather than subjective responsibility. In other words, the application of the prohibition depends on whether the impugned operation caused the forcible effects rather than on whether those effects were caused intentionally or negligently. Second, it examines when a State can be said to have caused the forcible effects arising from its operations. In doing so, it explains that causation comprises two elements: factual and legal causation. This article posits that factual causation can be established where the forcible effects would not have occurred but for the State’s conduct, and that legal causation can be established where a reasonable State would have foreseen that the forcible effects would have occurred in the ordinary course of events.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Law
ID Code:127112
Publisher:U.S. Naval War College

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