Fittingness and other normative categories

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Ó Maonaile, R. (2026) Fittingness and other normative categories. PhD thesis, University of Reading. doi: 10.48683/1926.00129453

Abstract/Summary

This thesis is about the relations between different normative categories. Normative categories are things like reasons, oughts, values, and fittingness. The guiding question is this: can we explain the nature of one normative category in terms of another? Specifically, I am interested in explaining the nature of fittingness, a normative category which has received increased attention in recent years. The thesis develops several related claims: (1) fittingness is irreducible to other normative categories; we cannot explain the nature of fit in terms of value or the balance of normative reasons, (2) there is no one normative category which fully explains all the others; all X-First views are seriously flawed, and (3) the project of explaining the nature of normative categories and the relations between them is best advanced by articulating the particular features that unite and divide them.

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Item Type Thesis (PhD)
URI https://centaur.reading.ac.uk/id/eprint/129453
Identification Number/DOI 10.48683/1926.00129453
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Date on Title Page September 2025
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