Eliminativism about derivative prima facie dutiesStratton-Lake, P. (2011) Eliminativism about derivative prima facie duties. In: Hurka, T. (ed.) Underivative Duty: British Moralists from Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford University Press, Oxford , pp. 146-165. ISBN 9780199577446 Full text not archived in this repository. It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. Abstract/SummaryRoss divides prima facie duties into derivative and foundational ones, but seems to understand the notion of a derivative prima facie duty in two very different ways. Sometimes he understands them in a non-eliminativist way. According to this understanding, basic prima facie duties ground distinct derivative ones. According to the eliminativist understanding, basic duties do not ground distinct derivative duties, but replace (eliminate) them. On the eliminativist view, discovering that a prima facie duty is derivative is discovering that it is not genuine. The genuine one is the basic one. I argue that Ross is best understood as an eliminativist.
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