Accessibility navigation


The vulnerable subject of negligence law

Stychin, C. (2012) The vulnerable subject of negligence law. International Journal of Law in Context, 8 (3). pp. 337-353. ISSN 1744-5531

Full text not archived in this repository.

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

To link to this item DOI: 10.1017/S1744552312000249

Abstract/Summary

The approach taken by English courts to the duty of care question in negligence has been subject to harsh criticism in recent years. This article examines this fundamental issue in tort law, drawing upon Canadian and Australian jurisprudence by way of comparison. From this analysis, the concept of vulnerability is developed as a productive means of understanding the duty of care. Vulnerability is of increasing interest in legal and political theory and it is of particular relevance to the law of negligence. In addition to aiding doctrinal coherence, vulnerability – with its focus on relationships and care – has the potential to broaden the way in which the subject of tort law is conceived because it challenges dominant assumptions about autonomy as being prior to the relationships on which it is dependent.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Law
ID Code:28003
Publisher:Cambridge University Press

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Page navigation