Conformism and reciprocity in public good provisionBardsley, N. and Sausbrueber, R. (2005) Conformism and reciprocity in public good provision. Journal of Economic Psychology, 26 (5). pp. 664-681. ISSN 0167-4870 Full text not archived in this repository. It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2005.02.001 Abstract/SummaryPeople contribute more to experimental public goods the more others contribute, a tendency called “crowding-in.” We propose a novel experimental design to distinguish two possible causes of crowding-in: reciprocity, the usual explanation, and conformity, a neglected alternative. Subjects are given the opportunity to react to contributions of a payoff-irrelevant group, in addition to their own group. We find evidence of conformity, accounting for roughly 1/3 of crowding-in.
Altmetric Deposit Details University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record |
Lists
Lists
