Gender differences in ultimatum games: despite rather than due to risk attitudesGarcía-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N. and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, A. (2012) Gender differences in ultimatum games: despite rather than due to risk attitudes. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83 (1). pp. 42-49. ISSN 0167-2681 Full text not archived in this repository. It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.012 Abstract/SummaryWe analyze experimental data obtained from an ultimatum game framed as a situation of employee-employer negotiation over salaries. Parallel to this, we elicit subjects' risk attitudes. In the existing literature, it has often been conjectured that gender differences in strategic environments are partly due to differences in risky decision making. Our evidence suggests that both gender and risk-related effects co-exist in ultimatum bargaining. However, differences in risk attitudes cannot explain gender effects in ultimatum bargaining.
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