Ultimatum salary bargaining with real effortGarcía-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N. and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, A. (2008) Ultimatum salary bargaining with real effort. Economics Letters, 98 (1). pp. 78-83. ISSN 01651765
It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.04.009 Abstract/SummaryWe report experimental results on ultimatum salary bargaining with a real task performed by employee subjects. Compared to the baseline treatment with a hypothetical task, the introduction of a real task raises offers, accepted wages and rejection rates.
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