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Terrorism and cabinet duration

Gassebner, M., Jong-A-Pin, R. and Mierau, J. O. (2011) Terrorism and cabinet duration. International Economic Review, 52 (4). pp. 1253-1270. ISSN 0020-6598

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00666.x


Terrorism can strengthen or weaken electoral support for ruling governments. We show in a simple model of coalition formation that, regardless of the direction of a public opinion shock, the impact of terrorism on cabinet duration is ambiguous. However, in an analysis of a data set including 2,400 cabinets in over 150 countries in the period 1970–2002, we find that terrorism, on average, shortens cabinet duration. This result is robust for a range of alternative terror measures and is present in both democratic as well as autocratic political regimes.

Item Type:Article
Divisions:No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
ID Code:34880

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