Borderline cases and the collapsing principleElson, L. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3013-8030 (2014) Borderline cases and the collapsing principle. Utilitas, 26 (1). pp. 51-60. ISSN 1741-6183
It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.1017/S095382081300023X Abstract/SummaryJohn Broome has argued that value incommensurability is vagueness, by appeal to a controversial ‘collapsing principle’ about comparative indeterminacy. I offer a new counterexample to the collapsing principle. That principle allows us to derive an outright contradiction from the claim that some object is a borderline case of some predicate. But if there are no borderline cases, then the principle is empty. The collapsing principle is either false or empty.
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