A revenge problem without the concept of truthPinder, M. (2015) A revenge problem without the concept of truth. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 4 (3). pp. 151-161. ISSN 2161-2234
It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.1002/tht3.168 Abstract/SummaryThe vast majority of putative solutions to the liar paradox face the infamous revenge problem. In recent work, however, Kevin Scharp has extensively developed an exciting and highly novel ‘inconsistency approach’ to the paradox that, he claims, does not face revenge. If Scharp is right, then this represents a significant step forward in our attempts to solve the liar paradox. However, in this paper, I raise a revenge problem that faces Scharp’s inconsistency approach.
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