Accessibility navigation

Raz on rights: human rights, fundamental rights and balancing

Zanghellini, A. (2017) Raz on rights: human rights, fundamental rights and balancing. Ratio Juris, 30 (1). pp. 25-40. ISSN 1467-9337

Text - Accepted Version
· Please see our End User Agreement before downloading.


It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

To link to this item DOI: 10.1111/raju.12156


After clarifying the outlines of Raz’s interest theory of rights and its relationship to aspects of the principles theory of rights, I consider how his recent observations on human rights fit (or fail to fit) into the interest theory. I then address two questions. First, I elaborate on Raz’s definition of morally fundamental rights, arguing that he is right in claiming that there are no such rights. I then show that the interest theory accommodates the notion that rights may take qualitative precedence over conflicting considerations – a question that has become increasingly relevant in light of recent writing on rights.

Item Type:Article
Divisions:Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Law
ID Code:45898


Downloads per month over past year

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Page navigation