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Scoring rules and competitive behavior in best value construction auctions

Ballesteros-Pérez, P., Skitmore, M., Pellicer, E. and Zhang, X. (2016) Scoring rules and competitive behavior in best value construction auctions. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 142 (9). 04016035. ISSN 0733-9364

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001144


This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior of bidders in Best Value or multi-attribute construction auctions, where both the (dollar) bid and technical non-price criteria are scored according to a scoring rule. From a sample of Spanish construction auctions with a variety of bid scoring rules, it is found that bidders are influenced by the auction rules in significant and predictable ways. The bid score weighting, bid scoring formula and abnormally low bid criterion are variables likely to influence the competitiveness of bidders in terms of both their aggressive/conservative bidding and concentration/dispersion of bids. Revealing the influence of the bid scoring rules and their magnitude on bidders’ competitive behavior opens the door for the engineer to condition bidder competitive behavior in such a way as to provide the balance needed to achieve the owner’s desired strategic outcomes.

Item Type:Article
Divisions:Science > School of the Built Environment
ID Code:54927
Publisher:American Society of Civil Engineers


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