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Allocating group-level payments for ecosystem services: experiences from a REDD+ pilot in Tanzania

Robinson, E. J. Z. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4950-0183, Albers, H. J., Lokina, R. and Meshack, C. (2016) Allocating group-level payments for ecosystem services: experiences from a REDD+ pilot in Tanzania. Resources, 5 (4). 43. ISSN 2079-9276

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To link to this item DOI: 10.3390/resources5040043

Abstract/Summary

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) typically reward landowners for managing their land to provide ecosystem services that would not otherwise be provided. REDD+—Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation—is a form of PES aimed at decreasing carbon emissions from forest conversion and extraction in lower-income countries. A key challenge for REDD+ occurs when it is implemented at a group, rather than an individual landowner, level. Whilst achieving a group-level reduction relies on individuals changing their interaction with the forest, incentives are not aligned explicitly at the individual level. Rather, payments are made to a defined group as a single entity in exchange for verified reduced forest loss, as per a PES scheme. In this paper, we explore how REDD+ has been implemented in one multiple-village pilot in Tanzania with the village defining the group. Our findings suggest that considerable attention has been paid towards monitoring, reporting, verification (MRV), and equity. No explicit mechanism ensures individual compliance with the village-level PES, and few villages allocate funds for explicit enforcement efforts to protect the forest from illegal activities undertaken by individual group members or by outsiders. However, the development of village-level institutions, “social fencing,” and a shared future through equal REDD+ payments, factor into decisions that influence the level of compliance at the village level that the program will eventually achieve.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Department of Agri-Food Economics & Marketing
ID Code:68333
Uncontrolled Keywords:PES; REDD; REDD+; collective decisions; Tanzania; forest
Publisher:MDPI

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