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Interest Group Success in the European Union: when (and why) does business lose?

Dür, A., Bernhagen, P. and Marshall, D. (2015) Interest Group Success in the European Union: when (and why) does business lose? Comparative Political Studies, 48 (8). pp. 951-983. ISSN 0010-4140

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1177/0010414014565890


Business lobbying is widespread in the European Union (EU). But because not all lobbying is successful, the following question arises: When does business win and when does it lose in the context of legislative policy making in the EU? We argue that business actors are, overall, less successful than citizen groups in the European policy process. However, they can protect their interests if interest group conflict is low or the role of the European Parliament is restricted. A new data set on the positions of more than 1,000 non-state actors with respect to 70 legislative acts proposed by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010 allows us to evaluate this argument. Empirical support for our expectations is highly robust. Our findings have implications for the literature on legislative decision-making in the EU and for research on non-state actors in international organizations.

Item Type:Article
Divisions:Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Politics and International Relations
ID Code:70141

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