On some standard objections to mathematical conventionalismSchroeder, S. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4480-6458 (2018) On some standard objections to mathematical conventionalism. Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 30. pp. 83-98. ISSN 0353-3891
It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.5937/BPA1730083S Abstract/SummaryAccording to Wittgenstein, mathematical propositions are rules of grammar, that is, conventions, or implications of conventions. So his position can be regarded as a form of conventionalism. However, mathematical conventionalism is widely thought to be untenable due to objections presented by Quine, Dummett and Crispin Wright. It has also been argued that only an implausibly radical form of conventionalism could withstand the critical implications of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. In this article I discuss those objections to conventionalism and argue that none of them is convincing.
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