Abstract/Summary

Centring the philosophical concept of well-being is likely to improve the quality of decision-making outcomes in cases involving claims that legal protection of LGBTQ interests infringes upon religious freedom. A sound understanding of well-being presupposes giving up on the liberal neutralist fantasy of taking no position vis-à-vis different conceptions of the Good. I illustrate this by discussing J v B and the Children [2017] EWFC 4, a case about a trans parent seeking contact with her children post-separation. The case involved, indirectly, questions of religious freedom for the members of the religious community (including the children’s mother) in which the children were being raised. The question of what well-being means was directly relevant here, because welfare was the paramount consideration in the resolution of the dispute. But rigorously interrogating the meaning of well-being is key to a desirable resolution of conflicts between religious and LGBTQ freedoms even when the applicable standard is rights. To illustrate this I discuss Lee v McArthur & Ors [2016] NICA 39 (affirming Lee v Ashers Baking No. [2015] NICty 2), involving a bakery’s religiously motivated refusal to fulfil an order for a same-sex wedding cake.