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Can Streumer simply avoid supervenience?

Elson, L. (2019) Can Streumer simply avoid supervenience? Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 16 (3). pp. 259-267. ISSN 1559-3061

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To link to this item DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v16i3.508

Abstract/Summary

In his defence of an error theory for normative judgements, Bart Streumer presents a new 'reduction' argument against nonreductive normative realism. Streumer claims that unlike previous versions, his 'simple moral theory' version of the argument doesn’t rely on the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive. But this is incorrect; without supervenience the argument does not succeed.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:82679
Publisher:University of Southern California

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