Rescuing failing banks for financial stability: the unintended outcomes of bail-in rulesMiglionico, A. (2018) Rescuing failing banks for financial stability: the unintended outcomes of bail-in rules. International Company and Commercial Law Review, 29 (10). pp. 608-617.
It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. Abstract/SummaryThe regulatory architecture of the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) introduced rules necessary to prevent financial instability and systemic risk contagion. However the restructuring tools for failing banks, namely bail-in, precautionary recapitalisation and resolving plans are largely flexible to allow Member States to adopt domestic policy measures to rescue distressed institutions. This leaves broad discretion to national competent authorities to provide public financial support, a legacy of the bail-out programmes that can undermine the new EU bank insolvency regime.
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