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Reasons and oughts: an explanation and defence of deontic buck-passing

Metz, E. H. (2018) Reasons and oughts: an explanation and defence of deontic buck-passing. PhD thesis, University of Reading

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This thesis is about what a normative reason is and how reasons relate to oughts. I argue that normative reasons are to be understood as relational properties of favouring or disfavouring. I then examine the question: What is the relation between reasons, so understood, and what we ought to do, believe, or feel? I argue that the relation is an explanatory one. We should explain what we ought to do in terms of reasons, and not the other way around. This view faces a number of difficulties, in particular in accounting for supererogatory acts and the distinction between an action being required and an action being recommended. The analysis that I provide explains how we can solve these problems. In providing such an analysis, this thesis aims to be a contribution to the discussion of how we might elucidate the structure of what is sometimes called normativity.

Item Type:Thesis (PhD)
Thesis Supervisor:Stratton-Lake, P., Hooker, B. and Way, J.
Thesis/Report Department:School of Humanities
Identification Number/DOI:
Divisions:Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:83856


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