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Rationalising framing effects: at least one task for empirically informed philosophy

Fisher, S. A. ORCID: (2020) Rationalising framing effects: at least one task for empirically informed philosophy. Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, 52 (156). pp. 5-30. ISSN 1870-4905

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To link to this item DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1221


Human judgements are affected by the words in which information is presented —or ‘framed’. According to the standard gloss, ‘framing effects’ reveal counter-normative reasoning, unduly affected by positive/negative language. One challenge to this view suggests that number expressions in alternative framing conditions are interpreted as denoting lower-bounded (minimum) quantities. However, it is unclear whether the resulting explanation is a rationalising one. I argue that a number expression should only be interpreted lower-boundedly if this is what it actually means. I survey how number expressions might be assigned lower-bounded meanings, due to their conventional semantics or pragmatic enrichment in context. I argue that deciding between these possibilities requires foundational philosophical input.

Item Type:Article
Divisions:Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:92548
Publisher:Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas


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