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How “intuition” exploded

Andow, J. (2015) How “intuition” exploded. Metaphilosophy, 46 (2). pp. 189-212. ISSN 1467-9973

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1111/meta.12127

Abstract/Summary

Recent decades have seen a surge in interest in metaphilosophy. In particular there has been an interest in philosophical methodology. Various questions have been asked about philosophical methods. Are our methods any good? Can we improve upon them? Prior to such evaluative and ameliorative concerns, however, is the matter of what methods philosophers actually use. Worryingly, our understanding of philosophical methodology is impoverished in various respects. This article considers one particular respect in which we seem to be missing an important part of the picture. While it is a received wisdom that the word “intuition” has exploded across analytic philosophy in recent decades, the article presents evidence that the explosion is apparent across a broad swathe of academia (and perhaps beyond). It notes various implications for current methodological debates about the role of intuitions in philosophy.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:40210
Uncontrolled Keywords:analytic philosophy;descriptive methodology;intuitions;metaphilosophy;methodology;philosophical methodology
Publisher:Blackwell Publishing

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